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The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard To The Question Of 
Whether The Exigent Circumstances Warrant Exception Applied 
 
 The district court held that, for the exigent circumstances exception to apply, 
officers had to have “more” than probable cause to believe tainted marijuana was being 
held, distributed and used by Sessions, such as “hearing a person moaning or in distress, 
observing … a non-responsive person, being told that someone was complaining of a 
symptom of paralysis, seeing someone smoking marijuana believed to be tainted, etc.”  (R., 
p. 77 (cited Appellant’s brief, p. 2).)  The exigent circumstances exception “applies when 
‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a 
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”  Kentucky v. 
King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (internal quotations and brackets omitted).  Making sure 
that the tainted marijuana paralyzing its users was not further distributed or used was a 
compelling need without evidence that there were more victims.  (Appellant’s brief, pp., 
4-7.)   
 On appeal Sessions mostly ignores or misrepresents the state’s arguments.  First, 
he claims that because the district court cited and quoted exigent circumstances cases, the 
court necessarily applied a correct legal standard.  (Respondent’s brief, pp. 8-10.)  
However, that would be true only if the cited cases supported the district court’s analysis.  
There is simply nothing in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), or State v. Smith, 
159 Idaho 865, 367 P.3d 260 (Ct. App. 2016), that supports the district court’s requirement 
of evidence of persons currently in distress or currently consuming the tainted marijuana.  
Neither of those cases, for example, would prevent officers from acting to prevent harm, 
or limit exigent circumstances to addressing harm that is in progress.  By requiring that the 
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harm be underway (at minimum the tainted marijuana is in fact being consumed at that 
moment), rather than allowing officers to prevent the threat of that harm (by entering and 
seizing the marijuana before it can be used or distributed), the district court applied an 
incorrect legal standard. 
 The district court is not inoculated against reversal by merely articulating the 
correct legal standard.  “Constitutional issues are purely questions of law over which this 
Court exercises free review.”  State v. Forbes, 152 Idaho 849, 851, 275 P.3d 864, 866 
(2012).  Thus, it is this Court’s application of the legal standards to the facts that is 
controlling of this appeal. 
 Second, Sessions addresses the state’s argument regarding the district court’s 
finding that there was sufficient exigency to justify securing the home while they sought a 
warrant only “[t]o the extent the State is attempting to reassert the inevitable discovery 
doctrine.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 11.1)  The state did not make an inevitable discovery 
argument to any extent, so Sessions’ countering of the nonexistent argument is irrelevant.  
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.)  The district court concluded that the threat of harm could be 
addressed by securing the premises and then securing a search warrant.  However, if the 
threat of injury justified securing the premises, that is the epitome of exigent 
circumstances.  Indeed, once exigent circumstances justify securing the premises, as the 
district court here found they did, the evidence thus found is properly seized in plain view 
                                                 
1 Sessions also argues that the district court’s finding that exigent circumstances justified 
the police entering and securing the residence, but not searching for marijuana therein until 
a warrant had been obtained, was erroneous and dicta.  (Respondent’s brief, p. 9, n.2.)  
What is telling is that Sessions tacitly admits the district court’s finding that exigent 
circumstances justified entry to secure the residence is incompatible with its finding that 
there were no exigent circumstances.   
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and is not suppressible.  King, 563 U.S. at 462-63 (evidence properly seized after home 
entry justified by exigent circumstances of preventing destruction of evidence).  The 
district court’s “seize the premises then secure a warrant” standard is incompatible with 
this precedent allowing seizure of evidence once exigent circumstances justified the home 
entry. 
 Third, Sessions argues that the state is advocating an exigency standard whereby 
“warrantless entries would be justified whenever officers had probable cause to believe 
that an individual possessed any drug (or any thing) merely capable of causing harm, 
without any reason to believe the harm was imminent.”  (Respondent’s brief, p. 10.)  The 
state is not advocating any such a standard.  Although the use of illegal drugs causes harm, 
especially the prolonged use, there is nothing exigent about the potential harms of 
addiction, cognition loss, or other general deleterious effects of abusing untainted drugs.  
Ordinarily a single use of marijuana does not cause imminent and serious injury.  However, 
a single use of the tainted marijuana in this case would cause imminent and serious injury—
paralysis.  Thus, the only way to prevent imminent serious injury was to seize the marijuana 
before it could be distributed or used.  Sessions’ arguments, aimed at strawmen, do not 
show a lack of error by the district court. 
 Sessions does make one legitimate argument: “Even assuming the marijuana was 
actually tainted so that anyone who used it might suffer adverse effects, it could only cause 
harm if actually ingested.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 10.)  This is the crux of the application of 
the exigent circumstances exception in this case.  According to the district court, 
circumstances were exigent only if the marijuana had been actually ingested or was in the 
current process of being actually ingested.  No threat of future ingestion or distribution 
---
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taking the tainted marijuana beyond the police’s ability to prevent harm would qualify as 
an exigency.   
The exigent circumstances exception is not so limited, however.  Requiring the 
injury to have already happened or to be in the process of happening was contrary to the 
applicable standard, which allows police to act on the threat of imminent injury.  See 
Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 403 (“One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is 
the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” 
(emphasis added)); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“The need to protect or 
preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal 
absent an exigency or emergency.” (emphasis added, internal quotations omitted)); State 
v. Araiza, 147 Idaho 371, 375, 209 P.3d 668, 672 (Ct. App. 2009) (“law enforcement 
officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured 
occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury” (emphasis added)). 
An example of the application of this concept is found in State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 
482, 163 P.3d 1194 (2007).  In that case the fire department was dispatched to an old house.  
Id. at 484, 163 P.3d at 1196.  At the scene they found people who had just extinguished a 
flaming couch in the driveway.  Id.  Although “there were no visible flames or smoke 
coming from the house,” a soot trail and other signs indicated the couch fire had started in 
an apartment in the house.  Id.  Firefighters and police officers entered the apartment to 
ascertain if there was an ongoing risk of fire.  Id.  They found no fire, but did find a 
marijuana-grow operation.  Id. at 484-85, 163 P.3d at 1196-97. 
This Court rejected the argument that entry into the apartment was not justified by 
the exigent circumstances exception.  The Court noted that entry into a burning building is 
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justified by exigency.  Id. at 486, 163 P.3d at 1198.  “The exigency in this case was a threat 
of fire rather than an actual fire, but the principle is the same.”  Id. (emphasis added).  A 
fire can smolder “in walls or floors or under carpets for hours or days after something else 
has been on fire in an apartment,” which created the exigency of determining if there was 
such a risk.  Id.   
In Smith a threat of fire that could break out soon or maybe not for days was an 
exigency justifying immediate entry.  The mere possibility that something bad would not 
happen in the time to secure a warrant did not disprove the exigency.  Likewise in this case, 
the absence of evidence there were paralysis victims in the house did not disprove the 
exigency.  The exigency of preventing distribution or use of the tainted marijuana made 
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search was objectively 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse or to vacate, and to remand. 
 DATED this 18th day of April, 2019. 
 
 
        /s/  Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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